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Bronwyn Winter
The University of Sydney
WOMEN AND THE ‘TURKISH PARADOX’:
WHAT THE HEADSCARF IS COVERING UP
In September 2007, Michael M. Gunter and M. Hakan Yavuz published their article
titled ‘Turkish paradox: Progressive Islamists versus Reactionary Secularists.’ The
article was quickly disseminated within Islamic circles, including on the Muslim
Brotherhood Oﬃcial English website.1 This article was published shortly after the
landslide re-election, in July 2007, of the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP), better
known in the West as the Justice and Development Party (no direct relation to the
Moroccan party of the same name, although the two bear similarities in positioning
themselves as centrist, moderate and primary instruments of democratisation, and in
obtaining popular support against a state seen as corrupt and repressive [Ciftci and
Tekin 2009]). The core argument of the article was that the AKP, in power since 2002,
had become an instrument of democratisation in Turkey for both economic and
political reasons. The program of economic liberalism embraced by the AKP (albeit
already begun by previous governments), resulting in unprecedented economic
growth, and a widespread political appeal achieved by professing to temper religious
adherence with respect for secularism and democracy, along with an expression of
willingness to address the Kurdish question, combined with voter disillusionment
with the bureaucratic and militarised Kemalist state, thus turning upside down
historical political understandings of the ideas of the ‘progressive’ and the ‘reactionary’. 
Gunter’s and Yavuz’s argument reﬂects accepted wisdom among many of those
who are interested in Turkish politics, in particular in relation to women, and in
relation to Turkey’s bid to join the EU – this last being a key driver of the AKP’s
political and economic liberalisation agenda, according to many observers (see for
example Tepe 2005). Both of these aspects also call up images of France, framed
alternately as like-minded, as concerns secularism and the political debate over the
hijab (modern Islamic headscarf: the ﬁchu ﬁchu or ‘darned headscarf ’ of this article’s
title), or as an opponent: French president Nicolas Sarkozy is trenchantly opposed
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to Turkey’s accession to the EU, an opposition that was foregrounded during his
electoral campaign in 2007 and has been reinforced ever since: in April 2009, for
example, after having initially wanted France to move closer to Bush’s US, he told
new US President Obama to butt out of European aﬀairs after Obama had expressed
support for Turkey’s accession to the EU (The Times, 6 April 2009).2 With Angela
Merkel’s re-election as German Chancellor on 27 September 2009, press commen -
tators are suggesting that Turkey’s hopes of accession anytime soon may be dashed,
with the EU’s two most powerful members both opposed, advocating instead a
‘privileged partnership’ agreement.
This article will attempt to unpack the supposed ‘Turkish paradox’ as concerns
women, religion, secularism and the state, and as concerns similarities or otherwise
between Turkey and France. I will argue that the ‘paradox’ is not necessarily arti -
culated in the terms that one might expect and may even be less paradoxical than
might be assumed. I write, not from the point of view of a ‘Turkey specialist’ as this
would be altogether too grandiose a claim, but rather from that of a feminist scholar
who has worked for over two decades on women and the politics of religion, ethnicity
and the state, in particular in relation to the Muslim world and diaspora, and who
has a particularly extensive knowledge of French politics in relation to these and
related issues, including the protracted debate over the hijab. In my explorations of
these questions in relation to France in particular and Europe and the West more
generally, Turkey has continually come to the foreground in recent years. 
First, Turkish immigrants are now the fastest-growing immigrant population in
France and as a percentage of immigrants are the fourth largest national group and
the third largest group from a Muslim country, having recently overtaken former
French colony of Tunisia in the statistics at roughly 4.5 percent of the total immi -
grant population (Winter 2008, 92).
Second, the children of Turkish immigrants have been highly visible in hijab
‘incidents’ in France between 1989 and 2003, that is, those cases that ended in
expulsions and often in subsequent appeals to the Council of State. This apparent
Islamic revivalism among Turkish immigrants has been fuelled by some extremist
agitators as well as by organisations such as the youth group Cojep (Conseil de la
Jeunesse Pluriculturelle de France), of which the head quarters are in Strasbourg.
Cojep was previously close to Turkish Islamist group Millî Görüs, although it has
distanced itself in recent years. (Millî Görüs, ‘National Vision’ or ‘National Outlook’,
was named for the title of a manifesto by its leader Necmettin Erbakan, and is a
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previous avatar of AKP’s more hardline and now banned predecessors the Welfare
Party [Refah] and the Virtue Party [Fazilet]: moderate and democratic dissidents
from these parties formed the nucleus of the AKP.) Yet, Turkish immigrants to
France, notwithstanding a certain insularity (in part due to having no ‘postcolonial’
relationship to France so no French language skills or cultural connections), have in
the past been more secular in orientation and many remain so, represented through
such well-established organisations as ELELE: Migrations et cultures de Turquie
(founded 1984) and ACORT (Assemblée Cito yenne des Originaires de Turquie,
also founded in the early 1980s), both of which have active women’s sections, and
through individuals who play high-proﬁle con sultative roles within various
government agencies.3 So the shift to the religious right in the Turkish immigrant
population is on one level somewhat surprising, although on another level it reﬂects
both a global islamicisation of politics in the Muslim world and diaspora and the
growing presence of such Islamic politics within Turkey itself, via the AKP and its
predecessors. ‘Turkey in France’ is thus not so far removed from Turkey in Turkey –
including as concerns the hijab issue.
Third, the Third Republic France and Kemalist Turkey have frequently been
compared (including by myself ), as presenting similarities in making secularism a
cornerstone of the Republic and in harnessing the emancipation of women to the
cause of nation-building. Indeed, French laïcité is widely acknowledged as the inspi -
ration for Turkish laiklik, and Tepe has called the Turkish state’s ideology a ‘top-down,
Jacobin-cum-Kemalist brand of secularism’ (Tepe 2005, 76). Yet, the expressions of
secularism in both countries are markedly diﬀerent and so the com parison perhaps has
less validity in terms of secularising the Republican nation than in terms of gendering
it, in that both Republics harnessed the emancipation of women to the nationalist
cause (Winter 2008). 
Fourth, the French hijab debate and controversial 2004 law banning ‘conspicuous’
religious insignia from schools has been compared to the Turkish outlawing of the
hijab. Yet once again, these comparisons are misleading: Turkey’s hijab ban is far more
comprehensive than France’s, and in some ways far more hypocritical. (That said,
hypocrisy is also part of the story in France, where the same government that cham -
pioned secularism in 2004 fell all over itself the following year to orchestrate national
mourning for the passing of the Pope [Winter 2008, 78-9], and more recently, France’s
President Sarkozy argued that Europe’s ‘Christian heritage’ should be mentioned in
the Lisbon treaty: in the ﬁnal treaty this was downscaled to ‘reli gious heritage.’) 
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Finally, as mentioned above, Sarkozy has been one of the most outspoken oppo -
nents of Turkey’s accession to the EU, among the reasons being Turkey’s Muslim
rather than Christian heritage; Sarkozy has also famously said that at school, he had
learned that Turkey was part of Asia.4 The French National Statistics Institute
(INSEE), responsible, among other things, for all Census data, agrees with him:
Turkey is grouped among Asian countries in French immigration statistics, along
with the rest of the Middle East. This is, of course, presuming Turkey is indeed part
of the ‘Middle East.’ In fact, the country seems at times to be part of everywhere:
European for some (and perhaps most especially for the Turkish government), Asian
for others (perhaps most especially for the French president), and Middle Eastern
for yet others (perhaps most especially for nostalgics of the Ottoman Empire)… and
thus ultimately part of nowhere at all. The Bosphorus divides Istanbul between its
so-called ‘European’ and ‘Asian’ sides, and the past Christian and Muslim grandeurs
of this most paradoxical of cities in the paradoxical Turkey are in evidence through -
out the Old City; the ‘East’ of the country is frequently imagined as a dark and
dangerous Kurdish place of poverty and unrest – almost another country entirely;
and so on. Nobody in Europe quite seems to know what to ‘do’ about Turkey –
except, perhaps (again paradoxically), for Greece, which has entered into serious
albeit often fraught negotiations with Turkey over a referendum-driven reuniﬁcation
of Cyprus. On the eve of the 2009 Greek parliamentary election, however, Greek
Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis declared that Turkey needed to lift its game if it
wanted EU membership, Ankara’s record in terms of, among other things, the
Cyprus talks, was ‘not particularly promising’ (cited by Reuters, 29 September).5
Roughly a week earlier, Prime Minister-elect (at the time of this writing) George
Papandreou had pledged to try to improve Greco-Turkish relations if re-elected,
claiming that Karamanlis had not done enough in this area, but nonetheless echoed
some of the latter’s concerns about Ankara’s stance over Cyrpus and other territorial
issues (Reuters/Today’s Zaman, 23 September).6 It remains to be seen what impact,
if any, the change of regime in Greece will have on these negotiations.
Discussion of these many European and French connections with the ‘Turkish
paradox’ is imbricated with current transnational feminist debate, within and
outside Turkey, on feminist engagement or otherwise with Islamic parties within
democra tisation movements, on the possibility or deﬁnition of ‘Muslim feminism’
or ‘Islamic feminism’ and over the related hijab issue. This debate feeds directly into
a transnational feminist (and indeed more general) debate about the resurgence of
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religion in politics more generally and the new interrogations (or new expressions
of old interrogations) to which it gives rise, around women, democracy and the
state. 
The politics of religion, however, may not be the main driver of the debate on
women and the state in the Turkish case, notwithstanding the focused attention
given in both popular media and scholarly circles to the ongoing controversy over
hijab-wearing in public institutions. First, the process of democratisation in Turkey
would appear to be driven less by opposition to an autocratic secularist state than by
the political and economic crisis engendered by the peculiar combination of political
authoritarianism and economic liberalism under the so-called September 12 regime
(named after the date of the 1980 military coup). Ahmet Insel argues that the
September 12 regime’s policies and economic management in the 1980s contributed
signiﬁcantly to reconﬁguring the middle class in Turkey. On one hand, it economi -
cally disadvantaged an old middle class (or what Ahmet describes as the ‘traditional
republican bourgeoisie’) of petite bourgeoisie (artisans, traders) along with employees
of public and large private ﬁrms that had beneﬁted from protectionist policies. On
the other hand, it politically disadvantaged a new middle class of entrepreneurs and
urban professionals and technicians with their eyes on Europe, who were prevented
from benefting fully from the new economic liberalism because of the regime’s
incapacity to adapt its institutions. Insel describes this new middle class, with which
some members of the old middle class were starting to realign themselves, as ‘cultu -
rally conservative, politically nationalist and moderately authoritarian, economically
liberal, or rather, on the side of free enterprise’ (Insel 2003, 298). The natural allies
of this class, according to Insel, were not the ultra-religious right but nationalist pro-
capitalist parties such as ANAP (Anavatan Partisi: Motherland Party) and the DYP
(Dogru Yol Partisi or True Path Party), both of which participated in various short-
lived and unstable governing coalitions during the 1990s.
At the same time, this ‘culturally conservative’ and economically powerful new
middle class was developing networks in which religion and business started to form
alliances, providing a fertile terrain for the emergence of the AKP, which combined
religious and cultural identity politics with a pro-capitalist, pro-Europe and pro-
social welfare agenda. Carefully walking the middle of the road, the AKP appeared
to appeal to everyone – including feminists, for whom the state had long been the
enemy yet now started to look like their best friend, or at least a strategic ally, even
as many remained wary of its religious bases.
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Yet, in July 2008, when I asked well-known Turkish feminist political scientist
Fatmagül Berktay what she considered to be the biggest problem facing Turkey, and
Turkish women, today, her answer was not ‘Islamic politics’ or even ‘Kemalist politics’,
or even economic issues, or the headscarf issue, but ‘democracy.’ 7 This may seem an odd
comment in the light of the accepted wisdom on the new ‘Muslim democracy’ in
Turkey. It may especially seem odd when one considers the extent of reforms favouring
democratic voice in general and women in particular that have been brought in under
the AKP since 2002, in its moves to adhere to the so-called Copenhagen criteria for
accession to the EU. In its ﬁrst years in oﬃce the AKP pushed through a huge reform
agenda, including not only laws governing freedom of speech and information and the
lifting of a ban of linguistic pluralism in the press and education (with the Kurdish
minority clearly in mind), but also signiﬁcant changes to the penal code. A range of
reforms to the civil code granting signiﬁcantly greater equality to women in marriage
– and divorce – had already been adopted by the previous coalition government, with
strong AKP support. In 2005 the AKP reformed the penal code, providing stronger
protections against rape and recognising marital rape and sexual harassment as crimes;
in particular, it redeﬁned acts of sexual violence as ‘acts committed against the integrity
of individuals rather than against ‘general morality and family order’, and increase[d]
the terms of punishment for crimes committed in the name of ‘honor’ [sic]’ (Altinay
and Arat 2009). It also strengthened Article 10 of the Constitution providing for
equality before the law. Finally, it acted to address violence against women, via the
July, 2006 Prime Ministerial Circular Nº 26218 on the Prevention of Violence toward
women (yet to be enforced), that according to feminist political scientist Yesim Arat,
‘is like a feminist manifesto’:
The decree is important because it articulates the responsibility of the state for
prevention of any type of violence towards women and provides a detailed plan of
cooperation between diﬀerent state and civil society institutions to realize this
goal. The measures prescribed by the Decree reﬂect the proposals of women’s
NGOs at large and the statements issued by the Women’s Shelters Assemblies
that had been meeting since 1998 every year (Arat 2009, 10).
On the face of it, then, democracy would appear to be alive and kicking hard in
Turkey, and the Muslimness of its governing party to be of the progressive kind. But
a closer look reveals a diﬀerent reality – especially albeit not solely for women.
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There are many facets to this reality. Some of them are discussed at length
elsewhere and I do not intend to reproduce the detail of that discussion here, but will
mention them brieﬂy as they provide a context for the ensuing discussion of the
current situation for women in Turkey. In particular, there has been a noted stag -
nation in the AKP’s reform program since 2005, which is (again) paradoxical, as this
was the year EU accession talks oﬃcially began in earnest. This has produced what
Tepe terms a ‘democratization deﬁcit’: the government’s failure, despite its popular
appeal, to engage its citizens with the existing reform program or even properly
inform them. There is similarly a move towards a less democratic structure within the
party itself (Tepe 2005). This anti-democratic stance extends to punitive measures
against the AKP’s opponents, such as ﬁnancial attacks, via taxation, on liberal media
group Dogan, or the 2008 arrest of 86 secularist writers, members of civil society
groups and former military oﬃcers supposedly associated with a plot by outlawed
ultra-nationalist group Ergenekon to overthrow the government (Cagaptay 2009a,
2009b). Ongoing concerns are also expressed over the troublesome Article 301 of the
Penal Code outlawing anti-Turkish statements, which the AKP government softened
in 2008 but did not abrogate, notwithstanding strong outcry within both national
and international communities (including Amnesty International and the EU).
Other issues foregrounded are the AKP government’s inability to put forward
workable proposals to address the Kurdish question (Yavuz 2009) and its ongoing
intransigeance over Cyprus (Usul 2008). 
Freedom of religion also continues to be an issue, less because of the continued
highly controversial headscarf ban (that the AKP had in fact sought to overturn –
more on this presently) than because of a frequently overlooked fact: among the
many Turkish paradoxes discussed here, ‘state secularism’ is undoubtedly the ﬁrst. In
fact, discursive construction of an authoritarian Kemalist regime of which the
secularism is similar to that of France, contested by a democratic and even progres -
sive Islamist party, is, quite simply, inaccurate. It is inaccurate not only because the
AKP, as a moderate phœnix born from the ashes of the more hardline Welfare and
Virtue Parties, has openly claimed to embrace the principle of secularism (insofar as
it is respected within Turkish law and institutional practice), but also, and more
importantly, because the supposedly secularist Kemalist regime has not, in fact, been
secularist.
Although the Turkish Constitution, like the French one, guarantees freedom of
religion, in practice this is not the case. Contrary to France, the Turkish state outlaws
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private religious education of whatever denomination and, once again contrary to
France, controls the operation of mosques and the form of Islam practised there
through the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Diyanet for short: Presidency or Directorate
of Religious Aﬀairs), which has an impressively large budget and reports directly to
the Prime Minister’s department. Even Islamic women recognise that this is not
true secularism: lawyer Fatma Benli, vice-president of the association Ak-der, which
campaigns for the removal of hijab bans as well as for information about, and appli -
cation of, laws relating to women’s rights and violence against women, com mented
to me in 2008 that ‘a truly secular country would not impose certain religious
practices.’ 8 The Diyanet also pays the salaries of imams, which eﬀectively makes
them public servants; public remuneration of clergy in France is not only unthink -
able, it is prohibited by law. The only concession the French state makes to religion
is subsidies for upkeep of churches, which are technically state property and many
are heritage-listed buildings as well. It also, more controversially, provides subsidies
to private schools for maintenance and upkeep of premises and delivery of state
education curricula under the Falloux law of 1850 and the Debré law of 1959, laws
that have been the object of regular, and lively, public debate (Winter 2008, chapter
2). What the French state does not do, however, is impose religious education in
schools: in fact, it explicitly outlaws it, notwithstanding a now twenty-year-old
debate on the advisability of teaching, as a secular subject, the history and sociology
of religion in schools, in a country that is, historically and now, Europe’s most
signiﬁcant meeting ground (and indeed, conﬂict zone) among the various branches
of the three monotheistic religions and those who identify ethnically or politically
with their cultures. In Turkey, the opposite is true: Article 24 of the same Constitu -
tion that ostensibly guarantees freedom of religion not only allows but imposes
religious culture and ethics as a compulsory subject in public primary and secondary
schools. Indeed, as I prepare this article, a second national rally is being planned for
November, 2009 by Alevi groups to protest against this imposition and against the
requirement that all religious observance be conducted in mosques, outlawing
cemevis, or meeting houses, where Alevis worship (Hurriyet Daily News, 24 Septem -
ber).9 The Alevis are a liberal Shi‘a sect, with Suﬁ inﬂuences, and numbers are
estimated at anywhere between twelve and twenty million in Turkey out of an
estimated total population of roughly seventy-two million. Some Alevis took their
case to the European Court of Human Rights, which on October 7, 2007, ruled that
compulsory religious instruction in Turkey violated the rights of religious minorities.
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This is yet another ‘European problem’ that ‘paradoxical’ Turkey has refused to
address. 
Finally, the AKP’s supposed hegemonic hubris and inability to manage the impact
of the global ﬁnancial crisis have been foregrounded in discussions of the drop in
support for the party in the March 29, 2009 local elections, with a shift towards the
left-wing Kurdish party Democratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party: DTP)
on the one hand, and the EU-hostile right-wing Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi
(Nationalist Action Party: MHP) on the other. In a 2007 interview with French
review Mouvements, Seyla Benhabib had commented that
the most dangerous development of the 22 July [2007] elections is the return to
Turkish parliament of the MHP, an ultra-nationalist organisation closely linked
to the fascistic ‘Grey Wolves’ of the 1970s and 1980s … If the legitimacy of [the
AKP] has been reinforced, this is also the case for polarisation between the
islamists and the secular nationalists (Benhabib 2007, my translation). 
The 2009 local elections appear to conﬁrm Benhabib’s fears, because not only did the
MHP perform very well but the Kemalist Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican
People’s Party: CHP) also regained some of the vote. While the AKP remains the
majority party, the current economic uncertainty following a period of rapid growth
(unemployment had risen to a record 13.6 percent by December 2008 with a
commensurate decline in GDP), and the continuation, even exacerbation, of the
divide between the rich metropolitan areas of the north-west and the impoverished
rural (and Kurdish) south-east, have led to a lacklustre political outcome for the
AKP and indicate a marked repolarisation of Turkish politics (Çarkoglu 2009).
Within this context of ‘democratic deﬁcit’, to use Tepe’s term, women are,
unsurprisingly, the main losers (plus ça change) (Tepe 2005). Even the encouragingly
progressive tenor of the 2005 Penal Code reforms and the July, 2006 Prime
Ministerial Circular are deceptive. First, the AKP did not make these decisions
because of its own feminist consciousness: a combination of EU accession criteria
and pressure from women’s organisations over many years, as well as pressure from
women within the AKP istelf (as well as other parties including the CHP) pushed
it towards these reforms (ESI 2007; Arat 2009, 9). A 1996 CEDAW report had
indicated that twenty-nine articles in the Turkish penal code breached the
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Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, to
which Turkey was a signatory, yet the AKP had initially been reluctant to move
beyond cosmetic changes proposed for the previous government by prominent – and
male – academic Sulhi Donmezer. Even when it did move towards adopting the
feminist agenda, it was still not without interference by Prime Minister Erdogan,
who tried to include criminalisation of adultery but in the end also bowed to feminist
pressure (including from the European Women’s Lobby) and withdrew his proposal
(Arat 2009, 9-10). Most worrying, however, is the signiﬁcant lack of progress
concerning application of these reforms, which indicates a lack of political will on
the part of the AKP to seriously come to grips with the issue of women’s status and
women’s safety in Turkish society.
In a country where women’s education and especially political participation levels
are signiﬁcantly lower than men’s and where violence against women is a ‘harmful
traditional practice’ (to use the UN vernacular) that is diﬃcult to eradicate, the rise
of the AKP to power has thus not made as big an impact as its program of reforms
might have indicated (UN 1995). In 2005, during the AKP’s ﬁrst term, the UNDP
ranked Turkey 84th out of 117 countries on the Human Development Index (with
a HDI of 0.775). When this ﬁgure was disaggregated by gender, Turkey slipped to
112th position (UNDP 2008). 
The most immediately apparent indicator of this poor performance on women’s
rights and equality between the sexes is the continued low rate of women’s political
participation, despite recent public pledges made by Erdogan to include more women
within the AKP’s executive structures (Hurriyet Daily News, 27 September 2009).10
At the end of August, 2009, Turkey ranked 108th out of 187 countries in terms of
numbers of women in parliament, with ﬁfty women out of a total of 549 seats, or 9.1
percent. This is way behind the worst performers in the EU, namely Ireland and
Slovenia, tied at 89th position, with 13.3 percent women, following the next-worst
performers, Greece and Cyprus, in 82nd and 83rd position respectively, with 14.7
and 14.3 percent.11 Turkey did, however, double the number of women in cabinet in
2007 – from one to two! Just prior to the AKP coming to power in 2002, Turkey’s
performance was both better, with a higher rank of 82nd out of 162 countries (roughly
halfway down), and worse, with women parliamentarians com prising only 4.2 percent
of the total (UNDP 2001, 215). This means that while Turkey has made some
progress over the last decade in terms of women’s representation in parliament, other
countries have made more, so comparatively speaking, Turkey is lagging farther
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behind than before. Things did not improve in the 2009 local elections, following
which women made up only ﬁfteen of approximately nine hundred district mayors
and two of the eighty-one provincial and metropolitan mayors.
Even higher education levels and high levels of party membership are not a
guarantee of women’s political success: in fact, the research throws up even more
‘Turkish paradoxes’ here. Aydin and Damis (2008) cite a 2005 survey by Turkish
research company Pollmark, indicating that members of the AKP had slightly higher
than average education levels but a low level of female participation. Women are in
fact less likely to gravitate towards the AKP or other Islamist or right-wing
groupings than towards the left-wing Kurdish DTP (Citci and Tekin 2009; the
authors note a similar trend in Morocco, where the Justice and Development party
attracts fewer women than left-wing parties aligned with the labour movement, for
example). The DTP is also the best performer in actively promoting women’s
participation, being the only party with a quota system for women candidates and
having the highest percentage of women deputies in the current parliament with
slightly under 30 percent of all DTP deputies, which reﬂects the level of participation
in the party’s internal decision-making structures (Üsür 2008). Eleven out of the
ﬁfteen women district mayors elected in 2009 are also from the DTP. As Nigar
Göksel, senior analyst at the European Stability Initiative and editor-in-chief of
Turkish Policy Quarterly, notes, ‘if women can participate actively in local politics in
these regions’ characterised by high female illiteracy, ‘quasi-feudal’ family structures,
early marriage and the continued presence of ‘honour’-based customs, then ‘there are
clearly reasons beyond the nature of constituents or the qualiﬁcations of female
candidates that cause other parties to have so few women representatives in the rest
of the country’ (Göksel 2009, 1). Clearly, ﬁrst among these reasons is a lack of
political will. Göksel also stresses that ‘in terms of concrete beneﬁts to women across
Turkey, the local level is critical. That is where the implementation or violation of
laws occurs and where strong female role models will have the greatest impact on
community life’ (Göksel 2009, 1). 
While the AKP slightly lifted its game in 2007, with over half of the total number
of women deputies, and performs better than the Kemalist CHP in terms of both
its internal structure and parliamentary representation, it has rejected quotas for
women and has fallen short of its commitment to 17 percent made in its UN 2005
Millenium Development Goals (Üsür 2008). This record provides a diﬀerent picture
to that painted by some international feminist observers, of women’s outspoken
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participation in both the AKP and some of its harder-line predecessors, notably the
Welfare Party, of which half the members were women (White 2002; Turam 2008).
Interesting paradox: the hardline Islamist right was apparently more, not less,
successful in recruiting women than its more moderate successor. But this is perhaps
another example of the hardline right’s political understanding that conservative
women are among its most useful vote-winners, as feminist commentators have
observed in relation to other contexts (e.g. Sawer and Simms 1993; Bacchetta and
Power eds 2002). These conﬂicting images nonetheless indicate that vocal participa -
tion does not in itself translate into improved representation, if participation is
conditional on ﬁtting in with traditionalist male-supremacist thinking on women’s
appropriate social role.
Turkey is similarly lagging in terms of women’s education levels: only 83 percent
of adult women are literate and for every four boys enrolled in high school, there are
only three girls (UNDP 2008, Arat 2009, 7). It lags most of all, however, in terms of
workforce participation. Women’s average income is roughly half that of men,
although women fare better in urban areas with up to four-ﬁfths of male income
(UNDP 2001, 215; KEIG 2009, 7-8). Moreover, women’s underemployment and
the signiﬁcant amount of unpaid work done by women in agricultural areas have
been noted as areas of concern (KEIG 2009). In 2008, the EU Progress Report
showed women’s workforce participation to be 24.8% on average, but in many areas
it is lower and Göksel, citing a 2006 World Bank report, observes that women
engaged in unpaid agricultural labour are also counted in these statistics, so the
participation rate is even lower if assessed in terms of actual income (Göksel 2009,
2). Göksel further notes that Turkey ranks 123rd out of 130 countries in the World
Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index, and what drags Turkey down the most in this
Index is its poor rate of women’s workforce participation (Göksel 2009, 1). The
Turkish Women’s Labour and Employment Initiative Platform, KEIG, representing
twenty-seven women’s organisations working on women’s labour and employment,
has further noted that women are disadvantaged in terms of lack of promotion
opportunities, underrepresentation by and within trade unions, overrepresentation in
informal employment sectors and exclusion from social security. Social Security and
General Health Insurance Law Nº 5510 of 2008 not only continues to exclude non-
wage earners from pensions, health insurance and other beneﬁts, but also has made
it more diﬃcult even for some categories of waged workers to meet contribution
fees or qualify for beneﬁts. These measures disproportionately impact on women due
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to their low workforce participation rates and overrepresentation in low paid,
domestic service and informal work (KEIG 2009, 8-9).
A recently released large nationwide survey on violence against women in Turkey
found that while there appeared to be a growing consciousness among women that
male violence was unacceptable (92 percent of women surveyed), with a corres -
ponding attribution of responsibility to the state and its institutions to deal with the
problem, roughly one third of Turkish women continue to suﬀer spousal violence and
almost half of these women did not speak out about cases of violence inﬂicted upon
them by their husbands (Altinay and Arat 2009). This study, only the second of its
kind (the ﬁrst being in 1993), was conducted with 1800 individual women who were
married, widowed or divorced, and 50 women’s organisations in 2006 and 2007. Its
authors found a roughly even geographical distribution in the incidence of violence
between the urbanised West and the rural East, which, like women’s participation in
the DTP, counters stereotypical assumptions in Turkey about the ‘backwardness’ of
the largely Kurdish East (Altinay and Arat 2009: 66-8). It also found that women
with higher levels of education reported a lower incidence of violence but the authors
suggested that this may be due to greater reticence on the part of highly-educated
women to speaking out (Altinay and Arat 2009: 65). The authors do not suggest
why this may be the case, but one could infer that women of urbanised and highly
educated elites possibly feel a greater level of shame in reporting violence, given
class- and ethnicity-based assumptions about who is more ‘backward’ and who more
‘evolved’ in Turkish society. Yet the study also found that upward mobility could
increase a woman’s risk of being subjected to spousal violence: the risk factor
increased from the average of 35 percent to a staggering 63 percent for women who
contributed more to household income than their husbands; for households with
relative equity in income, it decreased to 20 percent. These ﬁndings suggest that
economic equality between women and men can be a stabilising factor in other areas
but that men continue to resent and resist women’s upward mobility in the
workforce.
Most importantly, the study found that the range of measures provided for in
Prime Ministerial Circular Nº 26218 remain lettre morte, in the absence of either a
budget for their implementation or sanctions for failure to implement – not to
mention the lack of information about the changes. This has led some women’s
organisations, including Islamic ones such as Ak-der, to take matters into their own
hands and set up information and support networks because in the words of Fatma
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Benli in 2008, ‘in 2002 the laws changed but no-one knows’. Moreover, Benli
stressed that notwithstanding these and other law reforms, the women of her organi -
sation still struggled to put issues such as violence against women on the agenda as
a social issue rather than an individual, private, family matter. Even when men are
supportive, they still will try to downplay the importance of the issue and try to
frame the problem as ‘normal’.12 As for Kurdish women’s organisation Kamer, one
of the most pro-active in campaigning against violence against women, it had by
2008, under the banner of its project ‘A chance for every woman’, set up twenty-
three centres for women ﬂeeing violence, whether from the state, Kurdish terrorists
or ‘family honour’-related male violence.13
The non-enacted measures provided for in Circular Nº 26218 include the
establishment of a Violence Against Women Watch Committee, a special fund for
women to start a new life after leaving women’s refuges, creating a national 24/7
hotline, subsidies for refuges run by civil society organisations, and setting up equality
watchdogs at parliamentary and institutional levels. Another law, Article 14 of
Municipal Code Nº 5293, requires all metropolitan municipalities and all other
municipalities with a population of over 50,000 to set up ‘homes for the protection
of women and children’ (Altinay and Arat 2009: 3). This measure is similarly not
enforced and progress has been extremely slow. In fact, in some cases there has been
regression – although it has not always come from the AKP. In December 2008, the
same (non-AKP) Istanbul city government that had the previous year (unsuccess -
fully) attempted to ban Turkey’s largest gay rights organisation, Lambda, removed
funding from Mor Çati (‘Purple Roof ’), located almost around the corner from
Lambda in the Beyoglu area (Altinay and Arat 2009).14 This is a signiﬁcant blow,
both materially and symbolically, to women’s domestic violence services in Istanbul.
Altinay and Arat conclude:
An eﬀective struggle against the burning issue of domestic violence will only be
possible if state institutions and governments act decisively, if necessary funding
is provided, and if government institutions cooperate with women’s organizations
that have accumulated experience in this ﬁeld. Our study shows that progress
above and beyond the positive steps taken in the form of legislative changes in
recent years and the Prime Ministry Circular of July 2006, is demanded not only
by women’s organizations, but by the overwhelming majority of women in Turkey
today (Altinay and Arat 2009: 70).
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Altinay’s and Arat’s study is important, not only because the topic is underresearched
in Turkey, but because it reveals the signiﬁcant mismatch between government
rhetoric on women’s rights and safety and government inaction on same. It also
clearly indicates that Turkish women demand much, much more and suggests they
have become disillusioned with the AKP, whose enthusiasm for women’s rights
appears to have ﬂagged as signiﬁcantly in recent years as its enthusiasm for demo -
cratic voice more generally.
Yet it is women who have been the primary symbols of progressive Islamic
democratisation in Turkey, through their wearing of that most overdetermined of
symbolic items of clothing: the hijab or modern Islamic headscarf. Here again, the
Turkish controversy has been compared with the French one, because of the debate
over bans as well as the protracted and high-proﬁle nature of the French debate, and
because of the aforementioned erroneous assumption that Turkish and French
secularism are basically the same. It is also, however, more recently being discussed
within the context of a wider European debate on the issue, such as within the aptly
named VEIL project auspiced by the European Union Social Sciences and
Humanities research dissemination program Platon-Plus.15 The acronym stands for
‘Values, Equality and Diﬀerences in Liberal democracies’ and has the explicit aim of
exploring debates on the Islamic headscarf in Europe. Results of stage one of the
project, a collection of studies of diﬀerent national contexts, were published in 2008
in a special issue of the journal Social Politics. The countries featured were Austria,
Great Britain, The Netherlands… and Turkey. Indeed, Turkey may not (yet) be a
member of the EU, but studies such as this, by their inclusion of Turkey, are most
decidedly framing Turkey as some sort of European state-in-waiting and certainly
as a liberal democracy with elements in common with EU member states. Indeed,
the introduction to the VEIL publication clearly and without qualiﬁcation includes
Turkey in a European list:
European countries have attached diﬀerent meanings to the veil, and while some
countries might have similar views of its meaning, this has not necessarily
translated into homogenous policy measures. Countries such as France and Turkey
have issued a ban on the wearing of the veil in public institutions, Austria has no
prohibitive regulations and only little public debate, and in the United Kingdom
the decision rest with head of schools…. So what is the meaning behind veiling
in Europe? (Kilic, Saharso and Sauer 2008: 397).
BRONWYN WINTER230
Modern Greek:Layout 1  10/11/2010  5:25 PM  Page 230
These comments, in the second paragraph of the introduction, also clearly establish
a connection between Turkish and French responses. 
Yet the responses are not the same: the wearing of the Islamic headscarf was
banned in all public institutions by the Turkish Constitutional Court in 1989, the year
the ﬁrst French headscarves aﬀair broke out in a junior high school north of Paris. The
French Council of State at that time explicitly ruled against the exclusion of the hijab
unless it was accompanied by behaviours constituting proselytism, propaganda,
provocation or disruption to school order (Winter 2008, chapter 4). There was not
then, and is not now, any speciﬁc law banning the headscarf from all public institutions
or from universities in France; even if the 2004 French law is widely acknowledged
to target the hijab, it does not mention it explicitly but bans all ‘conspicuous’ religious
insignia from schools (Winter 2008, chapter 6). For that matter, there is no speciﬁc
law banning the Islamic headscarf in Turkey either: the Turkish Constitutional Court
decision was based on its interpretation of the fourth Turkish Constitution of 1982,
in particular Article 2 that states that Turkey is a secular Republic, and as Yesim Arat
argues, other interpretations are possible (Arat 2009, 12).
The Turkish ban of 1989, and the French aﬀair and ensuing debate of the same
year, occurred during a period marked by Islamic revivalism, with France being a
key site for its spread to Europe, for reasons I explain elsewhere (Winter 2008).
Various reasons are advanced for the revivalism, one of the most common being a
reaction against a combination of economic downturn and overly oppressive politics
of army-backed monopartist or feudal states (such as Turkey, Algeria and, in the last
case, Morocco, where revivalism has also been associated with a republican
democratisation movement that opposed the autocratic rule of King Hassan II). As
I have suggested elsewhere, such analyses tend to imply that revivalist and Islamist
movements are purely ‘bottom-up’ phenomena, whereas they are generally run by
educated elites: Insel’s analysis of the ‘new middle class’ and the rise of the AKP
would tend to conﬁrm this for Turkey (Winter 2001, 2008; Insel 2009). Revivalist
movements are also, even in their more progressive manifestations, often fuelled and
funded by conservative religious lobbies. Such movements take advantage of times
of economic downturn and resulting insecurity to preach a narrowly nationalist
and/or religiously conservative agenda, even as they champion social welfare and the
cause of the underdog (Winter 2001, 2008). 
Such ‘top-down’, somewhat demagogic manipulation of a ‘bottom-up’ surge of
resentment or protest is fairly typical of any political parties that gain a wide popular
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appeal at times of political or economic instability, and the AKP and its predecessors
are certainly no exception. Moreover, if the protest movement is to become a political
movement capable of making a bid for institutional power, it needs to have elites not
only on board but participating centrally in running the show. Indeed, the mobili -
sation of educated elite women in the service of Islamic parties has been discussed
within feminist literature, in relation to both liberal and hardline Islamic movements
in Turkey (e.g. White 2002; Turam 2008) as well as comparable movements
elsewhere, for example in relation to the women of the Islamic Salvation Front in
Algeria (Taarji 1990). More speciﬁcally, as concerns headscarf wearing within the
framework of contemporary revivalism, many observers – from Egypt to Bangladesh
– have noted the association of headscarf-wearing and even the adoption of religious
pietism with upward mobility for lower middle class women (Hoﬀmann-Ladd 1987;
Rozario 2006). 
In Turkey, however, there is a twist, which makes it not like Algeria or Egypt or
Bangladesh… or France. For in Turkey, the upwardly mobile associations of the hijab
revival are explicitly connected with the emergence of the ‘new middle class’ discussed
by Insel (2003). As Benhabib puts it: 
In Turkey … a new class of Muslim entrepreneurs, a middle class that was always
put aside from having power in the state by the Kemalist secular elite, has come
back since the seventies … there’s the emergence of a new Islamic bourgeosie and
this Islamic bourgeoisie wants to assert itself (Benhabib 2009).
Some years earlier, White noted that for women in the large working-class district
of Ümraniye in Istanbul, tesettür veiling (modern hijab) conferred a ‘city look’ which
‘gave it a cachet of upward mobility’, Islamic-style (White 2002: 213). As for elite
women, headscarf-wearing has become both a fashion statement and a display of
status, from the wives of the president and prime minister to the bourgeois women
one can easily spot in the main streets of Istanbul’s fashionable Beyoglu district in
the ‘new’ (and Westernised) city.
Yet, even if the brandishing of the hijab as a political banner needs to be set
within the dual context of revivalist manipulation and real or perceived social mobil -
ity, this does not mean that tesettür- or türban-wearing women’s cause should be
dismissed or its role in progressive mobilisation entirely discounted, especially in the
Turkish context. Apart from the most intransigent of Kemalist women, there is a
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broad feminist consensus that the ban, upheld by the Turkish Constitutional Council
in 2008, on headscarves worn by adult women in public institutions is absurd and
discriminatory (Saktanber and Çorbacioglu 2008; Turam 2008; Arat 2009), despite
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 2004 and 2005 rulings in the Sahin
case, which provide a contrary view. In 1998, Leyla Sahin, then a ﬁfth-year medical
student at Istanbul University, had appealed to the ECHR after not being allowed
to sit an examination because of her headscarf. On 29 June 2004, the ECHR ruled
that there had been no violation of Article 9 of the 1950 European Convention on
Human Rights, which provides for freedom of religion (paragraph 1) but also
provides for national legal limitations to the public manifestations of religious beliefs
as ‘are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the
protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others’ (paragraph 2). On 10 November 2005 the Grand Chamber of
the ECHR conﬁrmed the 2004 decision, arguing that limitations on headscarf
wearing were legitimate in the Turkish context where religious extremist movements
could exercise undue pressure on women, contravening principles of gender equality.
It also argued that it had no jurisdiction in terms of university regulations within
Turkey (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 608 of 10 November 2005, relative to
application no 44774/98). (In 1999 Sahin moved to Vienna, where she completed
her medical studies and has continued to live.)
What is particularly bizarre in the Turkish case is that an Islamic party is in power,
and the spouses of both the President and the Prime Minister wear the hijab. So that,
while the (often more conservative) husbands of these elite and professional women
can move about freely in the public sphere, the women cannot: they are excluded from
universities, from practising law in the law courts, from parliament. Benli also notes
that it is precisely the modern tesettür of elite women that disturbs: the traditional
headscarf of rural or poor women is tolerated – no doubt, I add here, because these
women are not to date, and certainly not yet in great numbers, claiming space in as
workers and social actors in Turkeys’ public sphere, and so are less threatening to the
wordly male order.16 Even women who continue to support headscarf bans in schools,
such as Nazli Ökten, who teaches in Beyoglu’s French high school, because they
maintain that minors should be protected from religious pressures, consider that such
clothing prohibitions should not be imposed on adult women.17
At the same time, the hijab’s deployment as a political symbol, when considered
alongside the AKP’s failure to live up to its promises concerning women’s rights,
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gives cause for concern, even among Turkey’s supposedly liberal and relatively
liberated women of the ‘new middle class.’ In 2002, Benhabib argued that her
‘Pascalian wager’ vis-à-vis movements represented in Turkey at that time by the
Welfare Party and its successor the Virtue Party was that ‘their democratic
integration into the public sphere through electoral as well as other civic practices
[would] force them to clarify the bigger political game at stake in their actions,
whereas their marginalization and oppression will only create dangerous martyrs’
(Benhabib 2002, 119).18 One aspect of Benhabib’s prophecy has not really been
borne out, because rather than becoming martyrs, the liberals within the Welfare
Party found a way to reinvent themselves as the voice of a moderate and modern (and
ostensibly pro-secular) Islam via the AKP. The other aspect of her prophecy, however,
that such movements are forced, by democratic integration, to reveal their true hand,
appears to be in the process of coming true with regard to the AKP.  It is coming true
even in relation to the hijab issue: at the time of the Sahin ruling, Erdogan showed
his hand by claiming that the ECHR had ‘no right to have a say on türban, this right
belongs to ulema’ (that is, advisors on Islamic law), thus suggesting that hijab wearing
is a religious prescription (it is not, as I and countless others have argued elsewhere
[Winter 2008, chapter 1]) (Erdogan is cited in Saktanber and Çorbacioglu 2008,
530).
But more importantly, the government is showing its hand through both inaction
on women’s rights and measures that actively disempower women. I referred above
to changes to Social Security legislation; changes are also occurring in the education
system, for example, via the reinforcement of religious teaching through high school
philosophy curricula, or recruitment of more conservative teachers, or the use of
public funds to expand theology teaching in universities (Arat 2009, 14-16), or
through publicly-salaried imams pushing patriarchal values (against women’s
workforce participation, for women’s obedience to husbands and so on), without any
censure, notwithstanding the 2002 Civil Code reforms or Prime Ministerial Circular
26128. Even if, as Arat notes, religious inﬂuence in public life may be operating
more subtly in Turkey today than it has in other contexts where religious parties
have come to power (the examples of Iran and Algeria immediately spring to mind),
and even if ‘the party in power [has] a liberal/conservative program rather than a
religious one … the religious conservative constituency of the party is emboldened
to practice and propagate its religiously legitimated conservative values that discrimi -
nate against women’ (Arat 2009, 16). Arat argues that it is not religion or Islam per
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se that is causing the problem, but the intermingling of religion and politics: a point
that has been made by feminist scholars throughout the Muslim world, time and
again.
I would, however, go further, and argue two things. First, most if not all religions
– especially albeit not solely the three monotheistic ones – are demonstrably male
supremacist, much as the army and the state are male supremacist, in their very
premises, foundations, institutions and objectives – even if feminists do continue to
engage with them, for reasons of strategy, self-interest, absence of alternative or even
profound personal conviction, need or desire (our lives and our selves being con -
structed in complex ways) (Winter 2001, 2006). Religion and the state, as two
masculinist institutions, are, however, a particularly deadly combination for women.
My second argument is that, like true participatory democracy, secularism is not
applied anywhere in the world at this point in time, notwithstanding the existence of
many nations that in their constitutions, their institutions and the professed values of
their leaders, identify as both democratic and secular. Even that supposedly diehard
‘inventor’ of secularism, France, continues to have a somewhat ambiguous (at best) and
cosy (at worst) relationship with the Catholic Church, to the extent that if one is to
discuss the issue of reinforcing secularism in France, then one should start not with
the hijab but with Catholicism (Winter 2008). Turkey, as another supposedly secular
nation, is an even more problematic example: not only does the supposedly secular
state maintain a cosy relationship with a certain form of Islam, it is a relationship
that was built not by the AKP but by the Kemalist state, that institutionalised and
bureaucratised a certain form of Islam and has imposed it on the Turkish people ever
since. It has also, just like any secular democratic European state one cares to name,
continued, directly or indirectly – if not through law then through its unequal
application or through custom and practice – to confer a less than human status on
women. Strangely, the AKP, even as it has come to the fore as the major instrument
of democratic Muslim opposition to the autocratic Kemalist state, represents as much
as continuation of the masculinism and religious imposition practised by that state as
it does an opposition to it.
And the big losers will continue to be women.
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